Preamble
The adoption of Resolution 2803 by 13 members of the UN Security council, with the abstention of China and Russia, on November 17, 2025, created a legitimacy for the ‘Comprehensive Plan of President Donald J. Trump to End the Conflict in Gaza,’ which included the creation of the Board of Peace that was to serve as a legally recognised international body to help with the transitioning of Gaza through post-conflict peacebuilding and redevelopment. Subsequently, the mandate of the body was broadened during its unveiling by President Trump, its self-appointed chairman, in Davos. In its charter, signed by the US president on January 16, 2026, the assemblage of ‘willing states’ was to commit to ‘practical cooperation and effective action,’ as a courageous departure from failed approaches and institutions. The board consists of 28 members including the US president, out of about 60 invitations, with two representatives from Egypt and Morocco as African. While Egypt had been integral to the negotiations between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Morocco joined on the invitation of the US President, and is looking to support the stabilization efforts in Gaza, not unexpectedly having earlier participated in the endorsement of the Abraham Accords. Board membership is for a duration of three years, subject to renewal by the chair or the payment of $1billion for a permanent seat. The board’s structure includes an executive board with seven members, two senior advisors, the Gaza executive board, and the Gaza Office of the High Representative (OHR) headed by Mr Nickolay Mladenov. While formally ratifying the board’s charter in Davos on January 22, 2026, its chairman noted its mission to harness resources globally for demilitarising and rebuilding Gaza, as well as reforming its government while enforcing accountability. Article 1 of the charter, however, expands this role to peacebuilding functions in line with international law to enable it create and share universally applicable best practices. The creation of the Board of Peace signals another episode in the series of a changing global order, where the world is undergoing a restructuring of its operational dynamics within the international system. This shift has also been characterised by the violations of the ceasefire in Gaza with conflicting parties trading blame, the continuation of crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Ukraine, the mounting tensions in Taiwan that appears to be under perpetual siege from China, and the launch of a war on Iran by the US and Israel after failed attempts at negotiations on its nuclear programme. This paradox was the thematic focus of the Africanist Scholars Forum which was held on March 13, 2026.
Observations
We observe that the exclusion of Palestinians from the composition of stakeholders in the Board of Peace, which was initially proposed as a temporary measure in Gaza pending satisfactory reforms of the Palestinian Authority that leads to self-determination, could undermine the legitimacy of the board in performing its supervisory role over the transitional government in Gaza. This role was stipulated by the UNSC Resolution 2803, which also subjects the board to the oversight of the UNSC to which it has to submit biannual reports of its activities. For instance, the Indonesian President, Prabowo Subianto, was reported to propose quitting the board if it is not beneficial to Palestinians. It also appears to be unclear whether the membership of the board is based on official capacity as heads of government, or individual capacity as prominent individuals. Its charter indicates that the chair remains after completing the term of office as his country’s president, and can only be removed by his choice to resign or unanimous votes by executive board members in the case of becoming incapacitated. Also, the chair retains the power to appoint a successor, create and dissolve subsidiary bodies, and the discretion to dissolve or renew the board, with the latter not exceeding November 21 of odd-numbered calendar years. This provision differs from the UNSC mandate of the board and International Stabilization Force, which was stipulated to end on December 31, 2027 subject to extension by the council.
The war in Iran has also influenced the perception of the board of peace, with the disarmament of Hamas, a prerequisite for the reconstruction of Gaza, yet to be attained amidst the violations of the ceasefire by both Hamas and the IDF. While Iran has been responsible for the regional spread of the crises by targeting US infrastructures within countries considered to be US allies in Western Asia, and extending attacks to some oil infrastructures in the Persian Gulf; the recent escalation of attacks on Southern Lebanon by Israel against Hezbollah reflects that both parties are yet to show commitment to de-escalating the tensions in the Middle East. Beyond this, the unilateral decision to attack Iran, despite the option of negotiation, has not been well received by a number of NATO Member States, and a major fallout from this has been the inability to coordinate efforts on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which is a major corridor for global oil transportation that had been barricaded by Iran. Countries in the region and some belonging to NATO have condemned attacks on non-military targets, with the latter committing to diplomatic and military support to reopen the corridor on the condition of de-escalation. However, the challenge remains as to clarity on the objectives of the war and whether they are same for the US and Israel as major protagonists.
The stake for Africa is likewise nebulous as from the membership point of view. It will be helpful to understand if the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt is identifying as Arab, African, or Arab-African on the Board of Peace. This similarly applies to the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Morrocco, a nation whose ambition to be part of the European Union is unclear. It appears that the continent has very little at stake with all the attention directed towards West Asia, though the continent has its fair share of ongoing crises in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo; both often considered by the US President as part of the wars he has resolved. There is also the resurgence of terrorist attacks across the Sahel with some expansion. The African Union (AU), though, seems not to have taken any official stance on the Board of Peace and terms of engaging it, perhaps due to the transactional approach of its founder, who prioritizes mutually, even if asymmetrically, beneficial bilateral engagements over bloc multilateral agreements. There have also been questions around the effectiveness of the AU’s approaches to interventions in managing conflicts on the continent, which come across as inorganic and short-term, partly due to reliance on external funding beyond the continent for its sustenance and major activities.
Recommendations
The creation of the Board of Peace as part of the redevelopment plan for Gaza provides an innovative template for post-conflict peacebuilding that could attract the needed investments for sustainable economic development within different structures of transition. Nonetheless, the question of inclusivity, especially in terms of depersonalising its principles and mechanisms of operations, needs to be addressed. The board has also been criticised by some for its inability to manage Israel, one of its founding members, during the ongoing crises in Gaza and with Iran, by ensuring compliance with its obligations. It is also important that it retains the oversight of the UNSC in order to ensure that there are procedures on checks and balances in line with its mission across conflict-ridden communities for the universal good.
The authorisation of a secondary title for the US Department of Defense as the Department of War through a presidential order in September 2025, to sharpen its focus on national interests and signal its readiness to go to war to protect them, indicates a proactive approach to be confrontational in putting America’s interests first. Though the defence of national interests is legitimate, it is often not explicitly defined, and its extension to other regions using a peace enforcement mechanism needs to be revisited to substitute short-term transactional measures for inclusive durable solutions.
The extension of 60 invitations for board membership is commendable as an attempt at inclusion, but the lack of representation from countries south of the Sahara is quite obvious, given perennial happenings that continue to undermine the progress of Africans and People of African Descent that are colour-laden. It is important that Africans do not remain inconsequential as puns to be tossed around by countries regarded as major powers, while doing nothing proactive to salvage its present condition or redeem a future of relevance for the upcoming generations. This is not just dependent on external control, but requires agency on the part of the continent’s leadership to assert Africa as a region of reckoning in the global scheme of things.