Preamble
On the morning of December 7, 2025, there were reports of gunfire at the Beninese Presidential Palace in Cotonou, the state capital. This was subsequently described as an attempted military takeover that sent shockwaves across the ECOWAS region, which has been plagued by several coups in recent years. With the breakaway of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) after its Member States (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) came under military rule, another successful coup in Benin would have worsened transnational relations in the region, particularly from an economic lens. Some analysts noted that Benin’s membership of the AES after a military takeover would grant the bloc access to maritime trade routes. With the AES currently landlocked, it relies on negotiations with ECOWAS Member States for maritime access to engage in international trade. While some commentators have praised ECOWAS for acting decisively to defend democracy in the region from another attack, others have called out the approach as a short-term, unsustainable measure because it failed to address the elephant in the room, which is the domination of Benin politics by President Patrice Talon and his supporters. During the 68th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments held in Abuja on December 15, 2025, further action was taken by the regional body through a proposal to develop a joint counter-terrorism standby force comprising 1650 military personnel. This is to facilitate collaboration on intelligence sharing and other military efforts towards security, so as to create political stability in the region. The initiative is also being facilitated by the West African ministers of finance and defence to raise and manage funds for its actualisation by the end of 2026.
While the action of political leaders in the region has affirmed the intent to tackle insecurity and preclude future military takeovers, kinetic measures have proven to be insufficient in stabilising troubled polities on the continent. Though countries like Nigeria have advocated negotiations, including amnesty, as alternate national strategies to tackling insecurity, previous attempts have not been sustainable due to the lack of transparency and /or political will for implementation, especially when they have been copied without proper contextualisation. These complexities comprised the focus of the December 15, 2025, edition of the Africanist Scholars’ Forum of the West African Transitional Justice Centre. The forum explored the circumstances surrounding the aborted coup in Benin Republic and the regional responses by ECOWAS, while proposing the need for more sustainable solutions through the adoption of a broad socioeconomic and political lens to engender equality among citizens in the subregion and the continent in general.
Observations
We observe the leadership role that has been played by Nigeria in spearheading the regional response by initially mobilising its military to collaborate with the Beninese and suspected French forces to carry out aerial bombardments targeted at the coup plotters. It deployed two military jets from Lagos as the Nigerian Air Force helped in driving the mutineers away from the military base and TV stations they had occupied during the attempted coup. Following this action, about 200 soldiers drawn from Ivory Coast, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria were sent as ground troops to Benin as regional contingents to restore stability in the country. Initially, the intervention of Nigeria was criticised by some as a double standard of invoking national sovereignty to protest the intended intervention of the US towards rescuing the nation’s Christian population from genocide, while interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbour at the behest of a former imperial power. However, official narratives from the country, including by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasised that this intervention was based on at least two invitations from the Beninese government in line with the ECOWAS Protocol, after the coup had been thwarted internally. Nigeria’s action continues to generate criticisms on what some perceive as disproportionate commitment by the government to regional affairs, which undermines the security needs in a country that is grappling with insecurity on multiple fronts.
While the search for the plotters continues, with at least fourteen arrests made thus far, its leader has been tracked to the Republic of Togo, with Nigeria again providing military intelligence and diplomatic support for Benin. The provision of a safe space for the coup plotters in neighbouring Togo indicates the fractions within Francophone West Africa, and worsening disjuncture flawing the bid to operate as a regional bloc. This lack of synergy is a major factor undermining the management of the Jihadist challenge across the Sahel, including in Northern Benin, which has been under attack from the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP). The jihadists have been operating across the borders from Niger and Burkina Faso, both of which have been struggling with containing attacks. Earlier in April, the JNIM killed 54 Beninese soldiers during attacks on the national park; and the month of September was particularly fatal for the Nigeriens who lost 42 soldiers in coordinated JNIM attacks, and 22 other civilians during a baptism ceremony. In Burkina Faso, the JNIM targeted a military base in Dargou during July with dozens of fatalities recorded.
The victimisation of opposition candidates through the weaponisation of legal frameworks and the constitutional court by the president is typical of the trend of monopolising the state and its resources by governments within the subregion. As it were, there is the possibility that the next president, with the former Minister of Economy and Finance, Romuald Wadagni, as the president’s handpicked choice, is being predetermined to win the polls in April 2026 without any viable opposition. Benin Republic adopted a new constitution in November 2025, in which the presidential term was extended from five to seven years, and the constitutional court disqualified the major opposition candidate of the Democrat Party, Renaud Agbodjo, for lack of support from lawmakers. The situation becomes more worrisome when one considers that a coup was planned just a few months before the end of the second term of the president, who is credited with achieving significant economic growth for the country. This either signals distrust in the electoral system or a misguided craving for power by the soldiers under the pretext of national grievance. The coup plotters, led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri under the name Military Committee for Refoundation, adduced poor healthcare policies, deteriorating insecurity situation in Northern Benin, neglect of the country’s fallen military heroes lost at the warfront and their families, unmerited promotion within military ranks, and denial of fundamental freedoms as reasons for their action.
Recommendations
There needs to be proper synergy in creating and coordinating an ECOWAS regional standby force, especially with the indeterminate nature of the successes achieved by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operating across the Sahel. It is important that Member States are committed to contributing personnel as well as funds in ensuring that the force remains formidable with high morale among the troops to combat insecurity in the region. It is likewise important to integrate an exit strategy at the beginning of operations in order to forestall arbitrary termination of actions that may undermine whatever gains the interventions may achieve.
The importance of returning sovereignty to the people amidst the shrinking political space across different nations in Africa cannot be overemphasised. The creation of (family) dynasties as perpetual oligarchs in national politics that perpetuate impunity by denying citizens their fundamental rights after misappropriating the sovereign wealth needs to be put in check to tackle the root causes of insecurity and political instability in the region.