The 12-Day War and Stakes within the Global Peace and Security Architecture

Preamble

The launch of Operation Rising Lion by Israel on June 13, 2025, through an attack on Iran’s military and nuclear sites in Isfahan and Natanz, rattled the global peace and security architecture as the Middle East again witnessed several fatal bouts during a 12-Day War. This action followed a resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which stated that Iran had not been complying with agreed nuclear safeguard conditions. The enforcement of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) dates back to 1974, but the lack of transparency on its nuclear materials and activities led to the 2013 Framework for Cooperation between the country and IAEA, and the development of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) by Iran and the E3+3 countries (comprising three European countries – Germany, France and United Kingdom (UK); alongside the United States (US), Russia and China).[1] The JPA was subsequently renegotiated to produce the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by both parties. The IAEA confirmed that its efforts on the verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programme were significantly boosted by the JCPOA and provisional application of the Additional Protocol. This assertion was supported by significant milestones achieved between 2013 and 2017, in which there was 89% increase in the installation of surveillance cameras across Iran’s nuclear facilities, 70% increase in seals identifying nuclear materials and equipment, 152% increase in the number of verification activities conducted, 100% increase in the IAEA’s presence for monitoring and verification activities, and over 1.2 million open-source documents on Iran’s state-of-the-art technology.

However, Iran halted its implementation of the Additional Protocol in 2021, which prompted the IAEA to call out the undeclared presence of ‘man-made uranium particles’ at Varamin, Marivan and Turquzabad, though the agency maintained that there was no evidence of the production of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, Israel justified its operation as a pre-emptive strike, based on its assumption that the IAEA’s resolution confirms Iran’s covert nuclear weapons programme. In response, Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry denounced the resolution as politically motivated, and questioned the credibility of the IAEA, whose Director-General had been accused of spying on Iran for Israel in the past. He was also accused of using the agency to mobilise support from the West towards the ambition of taking over as the UN Secretary-General. The ministry maintained that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes. Amidst the rising tension, the US President on June 22, 2025, authorised strikes on three of Iran’s nuclear sites with the aim of causing significant damage to its nuclear programme. Iran responded with strikes on a US airbase in Al Udeid, Qatar; as it did with direct strikes on Israel after the provocative attack. Following the retaliation, a ceasefire mediated by the US and Qatar was announced by the US President via Truth Social on June 24, 2025, to declare the end of the 12-Day War. However, Iran, through the approval of a legislation by the Guardian Council, opted to pull out of cooperation with the IAEA by removing the surveillance cameras, as well as halting inspection activities and submission of reports on its nuclear programmes. With the turn of events, the Africanist Scholars Forum of June 28, 2025, explored the unravelling of the latest tension between Israel and Iran, and its implications for global peace and security.

 

Observations

In reference to a similar historical antecedent, we observe that there was comparable tension in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, after allegations by the US and UK that it posed imminent threat to global stability by being in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This was based on the IAEA’s report confirming the presence of high-tolerance aluminium tubes, which could potentially be used for uranium enrichment, in the country. Nevertheless, there was no evidence of an uranium enrichment programme after the invasion. Following the IAEA declaration of being blindsided by Iran with respect to its nuclear programme in recent times, Israel justified its attack on Iran as ‘anticipatory self-defence,’ since the latter is considered by the former to be a threat to its existence. One of the arguments regarding this threat is the embedment of slogans such as ‘Death to Israel!’ and ‘Death to America!,’ in popular chants, which appear to be endorsed by the state at official and public gatherings. Iranian state representatives, in their defence, maintain that the annihilation intended was against interference of the US and Israel in the ideological directions of the country’s policies, rather than the infliction of physical harm on entities connected to both countries. However, such provocative chants in a volatile region, without doubt, undermine the assertion of the rights to self-expression and/or self-determination they purportedly carry, and have no place in 21st Century international relations.

We note that on June 13, 2025, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in a letter to the Director-General of the IAEA, Dr Rafael Grossi, stated that Iran will not hesitate to use ‘special measures’ in the protection of its nuclear equipment and materials. Dr Grossi’s response, though, was firm in maintaining that any relocation of these entities from safeguarded facilities must be declared as required under the safeguard agreement. However, it appears Israel was able to cause significant damage to visible sites of Iran’s nuclear program, while the US effectively attacked underground nuclear facilities. While cruise missiles had been deployed on buildings for uranium conversion and enriched materials storage tunnels at the Isfahan nuclear site, ground-penetrating munitions (GPMs) were used on the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. The visibility of craters at the Fordow site, containing centrifuges used for the 60% enrichment of at least 400kg of uranium, confirmed that the GPMs used had most likely caused significant damage. Nonetheless, the 400kg of enriched uranium was yet to be accounted for as at the time of the forum.

Apart from threatening the nuclear non-proliferation/use efforts that may have helped provide restraints among belligerent nations for several decades, the recent attacks on Iran have generated divergent reactions from different countries, including those that are considered to be nuclear powers. 21 Arab and predominantly Muslim countries issued a statement on June 16, 2025, condemning Israel’s attack on Iran as violating the UN Charter. These included Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkiye, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. China and Russia also condemned the attacks, while the UK and EU bloc denounced Iran’s nuclear program and urged a return to the negotiating table. The UN likewise condemned the attacks on Iran and called for de-escalation to avoid the spread of the crisis. The war affirmed the vulnerabilities of innocent civilians, including women and children, to harm during hostilities. For context, at least 610 fatalities were recorded in Iran as reported by its Ministry of Health and Medical Education, and not less than 28 in Israel according to the country’s Ministry of Health. Thousands of injuries were also recorded with about 3,238 in the latter and 4,746 in the former. Iran’s victimisation of some citizens in the aftermath of the attacks, especially those domiciled in restive localities such as the Kurdish region, through arbitrary arrests and executions by the Revolutionary Guards and Basij Militia, is evidence of the suppressive nature of governance in the Islamic Republic.

 

Recommendations

With a return to the negotiating table inevitable, the IAEA President advised that agreements be based on facts generated from the IAEA experts’ on-the-ground assessment of the situation at the nuclear facilities. We add that negotiations ought to go beyond the complexities of monitoring Iranian nuclear activities to simpler considerations for entrenching the culture of accommodation across the Middle East through both formal and informal channels that leverage people-to-people exchanges. A renegotiation of the Abraham Accords, designed to foster cooperation and promote interreligious and inter-racial collaborations, is thus germane. This should be guided by a proactive inclusive principle to integrate countries like Iran, rather than a reactive proposition of neutralising Iranian threats and crippling the axis of resistance.

While Iran confirmed that there was no increase in off-site radiation at the three locations that were attacked, the IAEA’s reiteration to the UNSC that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should be prohibited to preclude radioactive exposure of innocent civilians both within and outside the borders of countries with nuclear facilities must be given actionable consideration. We, therefore, add our voice to the call that the use of force be jettisoned for that of reason, in order to reach a negotiated agreement that will guarantee global safety and create a blueprint for deterrence and restraint regarding the craving for nuclear weapons by Iran or other aspiring countries. Following from this, Iran should repeal the legislation that terminates its cooperation with the IAEA, and abide by the terms of the JCPOA and Additional Protocol or subsequent negotiated agreements, designed to facilitate a clean and transparent nuclear programme that is oriented towards the development and prosperity of the country, and acceptable to the global community.

On a final note, efforts at nuclear non-proliferation should be a step leading up to the process of denuclearisation in ensuring a safer world. It is thus important that countries with nuclear warheads commit to negotiating the process of denuclearisation, as the joint focus should be on creating a global regime for the sole use of nuclear technology in development, rather than to amass weapons of mass destruction with the intention of disrupting global peace and order.

[1] The E3+3 is also known as the P5+1 to indicate their permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) except for Germany. All five permanent members are also in possession of nuclear weapons.

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