by
Madhuvanti Gia Mukherjee
Introduction
The African Union (AU) and other regional governing organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have assumed the leading role in advancing the operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle within the continent. These entities actively denounce impunity, while upholding the prerogative to intervene in a member state where transgressions such as war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity have occurred. This rationale is chiefly rooted in the logic of “African solutions to African problems,” which posits that African governments bear the principal responsibility for armed and ethnic identity conflicts and, as a result, should spearhead responses to them. This perspective is closely entwined with anti-colonial sentiment that Africans ought to have the autonomy to determine their own destinies without being subject to the directives of the “neo-colonial,” Western enterprise. However, the practicality of these notions beyond official declarations has been hotly contested. Their efficacious implementation is contingent upon factors including the idea of state sovereignty, constrained institutional capacity, a lack of compelling motives for enforcement action, and limited access to explicit mechanisms for activating intervention clauses. Employing the crisis in Mali as a focal case study, this piece thus examines current struggles to implement these principles and coordinate with international entities to restore peace in the region.
Current Crisis
Mali is currently under the governance of a transitional administration, a result of the coup d’état in August 2020 and a subsequent consolidation of military authority in May 2021. The AU’s intended intervention plan in Mali has experienced a swift erosion, compounding pre-existing inequalities between Northern and Southern regions of the country. This deterioration has led to the emergence of ethnic militias and insurgent factions with affiliations to the Islamic State, particularly in rural farming and herding communities. Such a backdrop is coupled by the Malian state’s persistent struggles with corruption, poor governance, a pervasive “coup endemic,” democratic backsliding, legitimacy deficits, and consequent humanitarian crises. Entities such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) have perpetrated grave atrocities, including the killing, torture, and displacement of more than 30,000 civilians, UN peacekeepers, and government officials to Menaka, in Eastern Mali (CFR, 2023). The influx of extremist elements into northern and central Mali has also exacerbated tensions arising from fray rebel groups like the Tuareg movement, which has aligned itself with organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. The objective of these groups is to forcibly expel government forces from the northern territories in their bid to “liberate” Mali. This reality underscores the idea that in Mali, “democracy exists only in name,” serving as a mere facade for a political regime characterized by “political, social, and economic exclusivity” (Cunnings, 2016; Bamidele, 2017).
Sanctions
The AU’s 2022 suspension of Mali from “participation in all activities of the African Union, its Organs and institutions, until normal constitutional order has been restored in the country….[came after] the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) had condemned in the strongest terms possible coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of government on the continent” (AU, 2021). ECOWAS, which had been pressing for Mali’s return to elected civilian rule, also imposed economic and travel sanctions on members of the transitional authority in November 2021. Jointly, these sanctions have undermined the collaborative partnership that has existed in recent years between the Bamako administration, the AU, and the ECOWAS, despite their shared goal of reinstating civilian governance. Further, the imposition of sanctions by these entities to deter coups has been inconsistent and yielded mixed outcomes. While the imposition of sanctions might be viewed as a necessary coercive diplomatic measure to induce compliance with the transition charter, it may not yield the desired effects or reestablish durable constitutional order in the countries. Economic sanctions lack the requisite coercive effect to dissuade a power-seeking leader, particularly given that this individual may not possess the political will to engage with the leaders and beneficiaries of coups or to exact accountability from them (Mills, 2022).
Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, has expressed a need for the Pan-African bloc to explore new strategies to counter this democratic backsliding, as “sanctions imposed on member states following unconstitutional changes of government…do not seem to produce the expected results” (African Union, 2023; Presse, 2023). Such a strategy, then, is apt to induce substantial disruption to an economy already burdened by a multitude of national security challenges and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Mali, positioned at the epicenter of the ongoing Sahel crisis, demands specialized assistance to contend with the erratic behavior of its transitional leadership, employing methods that forego coercion or intimidation emanating from armed regional entities. This is critical as the termination of Malian access to regional trade, financial resources, and security assistance via sanctions engenders grave consequences for the physical well-being and safety of an already vulnerable populace, exacerbating the extant humanitarian crisis.
Lack of Political Power, First with ECOWAS
ECOWAS, in particular, has struggled to expeditiously and effectively respond to instances of mass atrocities, democratic backsliding, and legitimacy deficits in the Bamako administration. As is characteristic of trans-border, multilateral entities, ECOWAS predominantly operates through a consensus-based decision-making process. But a “consensus” of any kind is difficult to achieve when grappling with measures such as sanctions and military interventions that operate beyond sovereign state boundaries.
Exploiting this fissure, the military leadership in Mali has strategically leveraged prevailing public sentiments to position themselves as “champions of the populace” against neighboring entities insensitive to the need to instigate radical reforms in a nation plagued by corruption and complacency within its traditional elite. In the last year, Bamako has consistently responded to any restriction from ECOWAS, AU, European entities, and the UN with a resolute nationalist stance, framing these bodies as “extra-regional powers with ulterior motives” (Aubyn, 2022). Their actions imply a lack of political leverage to assert their right to intervention in the swiftly evolving Malian context. This exposes the moral hazard inherent in endorsing the “African solutions” approach. Despite espousing the normative stance that complex emergencies in Africa are best dealt with by African leaders without foreign — that is, Western — interference, this consensus-driven decision-making model latently enables autocratic African governments, such as the Malian junta, to immobilize regional organizations and deflect external criticism of their policies. In effect, this is achieved by providing other member states with similar geopolitical interests with strategic incentives to support them against the regional body.
Removal of MINUSMA and the rise of Wagner
This situation is further compounded by the recent directive issued by the transitional administration led by Colonel Assimi Goita to compel the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Malian government has been frank about its loss of trust in the UN’s intervention, citing a lack of improvement in the State’s grueling security conditions. Malian authorities have repeatedly argued that foreign contingents lack the “situational awareness, military resources, and willingness to take risks required to prevent attacks on the people they are supposed to shield (International Crisis Group, 2022).
Further, expressing a desire to augment military force against non-state actors, they have redirected their attention from Western partnerships, choosing instead to engage in diplomatic and military collaborations with Russia. Indeed, the partnership with the Russian mercenary group, Wagner, has resulted in numerous “summary executions, lootings, forced disappearances and other abuses,” coupled with an alarming number of targeted civilian deaths, threatening to further destabilize the already troubled region (Irwin, 2023). These assaults are not solely characterized by opportunistic acts but also demonstrate a strategic alignment with Russia’s foreign policy objectives in the region. Brian E. Nelson, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, explains that these actions “pave the way for the exploitation of their country’s sovereign resources to the benefit of the Wagner Group’s operations in Ukraine,” thereby establishing a firm foothold within the Malian economy (U.S Department of the Treasury, 2023). Hence, amidst the growing threat of security crises from non-state actors, Mali and its neighboring states, confronted with limited alternatives, have perceived the Kremlin as a pragmatic counterbalance to existing Western and African institutions.
To mitigate the exit of MINUSMA and avert the effective diplomatic isolation of Mali, it thus becomes imperative for the international community to explore alternative mechanisms for peacekeeping in Africa that are not solely under the purview of UN “blue helmets”. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, for instance, posits that “an option could be to replace [the UN peacekeeping mission] with an African Union force backed by a tougher operating mandate….a strong force to fight terrorism” (RFI, 2022). This is pertinent, given the “continuation of ground and air restrictions, persistence of tensions between signatory parties, and [timely] expulsion of the Mission’s human rights director from the country” (UNSC 9302nd Meeting).
Realizing partnerships between the AU and UN
However, historical frictions between the AU and the UN put into question the likelihood of such a transfer of power. Fletcher proposes that “instead of a muscular rapid-response force to halt genocide, protect civilians in coups or civil wars, and pursue jihadists, drug traffickers and pirates, African peacekeeping remains a hotch-potch, almost entirely externally funded and mixed into United Nations or foreign missions” (Fletcher, 2013). The AU’s lack of capabilities to independently conduct substantial peace operations, coupled with substantial fiscal constraints — it allocated a meager USD 5 million to the AU Peace Fund in 2023 — reveal the substantial pragmatic limitations to achieving a timely and domestic resolution of the Malian conflict. AU forces are thus incapable of sustaining long-term operations and, as a result, have routinely sought the intervention or assistance of the UN to achieve its aims. From a Western perspective, the resulting hierarchy of authority is clear; the UN’s decision to engage with the AU forces is contingent upon an assessment of the AU’s competence in addressing a specific crisis or the UN’s vested interest in the matter.
Williams, 2008 raises two pertinent questions: Firstly, what would be the consequences if Western donors were to determine that Africa no longer holds priority in their aid budgets? Secondly, to what extent are Western policies more oriented toward combating the so-called War on Terror in Africa and securing energy supplies as opposed to fostering the sustainable resolution of conflicts across the continent? The potential for “partnership peacekeeping” — a “cooperative” engagement between the AU and the UN — in Mali is thus disquieting for those advocating for a greater reliance on African military forces for peace enforcement and, in time, peacekeeping. The resolution of the Malian conflict requires implementing mechanisms that prioritize African self-sufficiency from the ground up through skill building, funding, and training. This imperative is not only pivotal for bolstering Malian democracy but is also requisite to ensure that the “African solutions to African problems” slogan transcends mere rhetoric and substantively eases political tensions in the region.
Concluding Remarks
The crisis in Mali demonstrates the constrained effectiveness of regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS in discharging their R2P, a concept that is frequently premised on a utopian “African Solutions” paradigm. This rationale persists notwithstanding the recurrent deployment of African peacekeepers lacking essential equipment, adequate training, sufficient funding budgets, and robust management structures. Such inadequacy, compounded by the inefficacy of sanctions as a disciplinary mechanism, serves to benefit African autocrats, as evidenced by the Malian case, enabling them to deflect international criticism of their operational policies. These individuals thus assume governance of their state(s) without possessing the necessary political capital, infrastructure, and commitment to civilian well-being. Nonetheless, all three of these characteristics are imperative for upholding principles of good governance and the rule of law in the region.
Consequently, a thorough examination of the efficacy of the “African Solutions” approach is needed, particularly as policymakers contend with how to determine the “ideal” relationship between the UN and regional bodies. Further, the judicious allocation of the relatively limited funds available for peace operations in this context is a pivotal consideration. These reflections prompt pertinent inquiries about the trajectory of the Malian crisis and the resulting interaction(s) between African bodies and their international counterparts. How can we transcend rhetoric to actualize operational peace, particularly amidst rapidly escalating authoritarian tensions in the region? More so, how can we ensure that peace operations form a robust, practical component to conflict resolution, wherein means and ends are harmonized? By heeding these considerations, we can approach the Malian conflict – and its subsequent resolution – through new eyes.
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Madhuvanti Gia Mukherjee is a student of Public Policy, International Relations and Human Rights at Stanford University and a Research Officer at the West African Transitional Justice Centre